Defense community leaders have spearheaded an effort to transform and elevate military capability around information superiority. This means improving decisions and outcomes by making US and coalition forces better informed, more coordinated, faster and more adaptive. Our research focuses on how to architect communications so these goals are reached. We find that the "smart pull" approach described in Global Information Grid (GIG) technical guidance can't meet these goals. The edu.This work has been supported in part by the Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), PEO Integrated Warfare Systems 6, and the Naval Postgraduate School.
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VADM Cebrowski was an early proponent of networkcentric approaches to warfare and operations other than war. His concepts are embraced in DoD visions for using information superiority as a foundation for better, faster, more effective military operations. The "bible" for these concepts is the insightful book by Alberts, Gartska and Stein [1] . As an introduction to this paper, I'd like to give a highly simplified description of what information superiority is and how such leaders suggest it will be achieved (cf [2] ). Responsibility for implementation of these ideas has, of course, passed from the seminal thinkers to such organizations as OSD's NII, the Navy's FORCEnet, and DISA's GIG/NCES groups. While people may differ on details, the basic ideas follow:
Networking makes it possible to communicate quickly, across great distances, and among diverse services and agencies. Thus, it should be possible for everybody to access all relevant information, regardless ofwho produced it or where.
Information superiority would then result from each operator finding and accessing all information relevant to the mission. To expedite this process, each supplier should provide meta-data describing the contents and qualities ofthe data supplied.
Bringing this down to a technical implementation level, all data would be marked up with some XML tags reflecting a supplier's categories for content and quality. An operator seeking information would describe the data properties desired. A network query would search for matching metadata and then retrieve the data responsive to the operator's query. Thus, the network would deliver all relevant data, with minimal delay, overcoming traditional barriers to effective information sharing.
Several additional qualities would emerge from this effective dissemination of data. All participants in an operation could share a common operational picture, assuring that all would sense and respond to the same perceived reality. Because they could all "sing from the same sheet of music, " they could self-synchronize, enabling higher levels ofautonomy and agility.
So the catechism goes more or less like this: What is information superiority? A state where each operator acquires all relevant information in a timely way. How is information superiority achieved? Enabling each operator to access quickly all relevant information leads directly to shared awareness, better decisions, and greater agility.
Unfortunately, we find much of this argument naYve and likely harmful. As a high-level motivational concept, it has served its purpose well. As a guide to implementation, it's seriously misguided. The purpose of this paper is to show why that is the case and how to achieve orders of magnitude better communication with much higher operator productivity. Such improvements, in turn, should lead to much higher operational effectiveness. In the next sections we revisit the basic tenets of information superiority, diagnose the naYve and dangerous misconceptions, and then proceed to remedy the problems.
SHARED AWARENESS & RAPID DECISIONS
One aim of information superiority is to support a shared and common situational awareness among collaborating forces. The Star Trek creature, the Borg, in some ways represents the ideal here: every member of the Borg participates in a common distributed cognition. When the Borg assimilates new units, they too become part of the group mind. In command-control parlance, all entities read and write from one Common Operational Picture (COP).
Recently, people have begun to realize some of the fundamental reasons why such an ideal is not attainable. First There's a tacit belief that these problems are marginal and that the best overall approach is to move, fuse, and disseminate as much information as possible. Following this logic, if we make the best information available, good things will follow. Specifically, when each person has timely access to all relevant operational information, rapid and effective decision-making will ensue. As an important side-effect of such optimal decision-making, operators will self-synchronize by referring to their shared COP.
I find this idealized concept implausible, because it doesn't address the fundamental limitations. Further, having studied decision-making in small and large organizations, in normal times and in crises, I think we must address these limitations to improve human performance. Specifically, we need to appreciate that humans are operating at finite information processing speeds, far below those required to achieve Borg-like total shared awareness. Moreover, because available information is rarely valuable for operators, it's foolish to focus on making them process it all. We ought to ask how we can assure they apply their scarce mental resources to highvalue information. Two concepts that underlie the answer are MCNs and VIRT, the subjects of the next two sections.
MODEL-BASED COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
If we can't possibly achieve Borg-like perfect distributed shared awareness because of fundamental limitations, what practically should be our objective? We should try to achieve three principal goals: 1 Most operations of interest to us involve dynamic entities moving through time and space. We often model these entities mentally, as when we dead-reckon an inferred position of a vehicle based on its previous reported location and velocity. When multiple parties are operating in a distributed arena, they often wish to create and maintain a shared understanding of the "state" of enemy and friendly elements in that space. This gives an additional significance to state-full communication. If the beliefs of each party about such dynamic entities are reflected in dynamic models, each party should be able to update its overall situation autonomously by deadreckoning the component models. Air traffic controllers, for example, maintain "the bubble" in their head: they continually project flight paths of all aircraft from current data into the future to assure no conflicts will arise.
A Model-based Communication Network (MCN) is a state-full distributed system of collaborating nodes that maintains an optimal shared understanding of the situation [6] . The situation at each node is composed of models of all entities relevant to its mission. team. 3. Land the helicopter at the chosen site. 4. Find and recover the party using the SAR team. 5. Depart by helicopter and return the party to a chosen medical facility. Given this skeletal plan, the planners then focus on possible aircraft and routes, total expected flight times and associated fuel requirements, and possible time sequences for the flights. The flights become highly dependent upon the assumed wind, visibility, and icing conditions en route and at the search and rescue area.
Let's complete the example plan. The planners assume that a 90-minute aerial survey will be required to choose the best landing site. They choose an available low-altitude aircraft that carries appropriate instruments and can reach the site in a two-hour flight. The aircraft has 6.5 hours of fuel, adequate for two 2-hour legs and a 1.5 hour survey, and still leaves a 1-hour mandatory reserve. Winds in the area are forecast to be excessive between the hours of 1300 and 1800 local, and adequate sunlight is expected only from 1000 to 1900. For these reasons the flight is planned for early tomorrow morning, so that the survey begins promptly at 1000. Thus, take-off is scheduled for 0800. The helicopter is scheduled for a 3-hour flight to the search area, and is planned to depart at 0900, so that it can receive landing coordinates at 1130 from the SAR aircraft survey team 30 minutes prior to touching down.
Even this example leaves out countless details, but it provides enough to illustrate the key VIRT architecture features. The VIRT dependency monitor watches for changes in forecast or actual conditions that threaten the plan by undercutting its justification. In the current case,
My USMC colleagues at NPS, under the leadership of LtCol Carl Oros [7] , have shown how VIRT can be implemented in many standard operations. Basically, we begin by identifying assumed conditions that each phase of the operation depends on, such as healthy troops, effective weapons, suitable communications, and credible target location and identification. Each such assumption is negated to define a condition of interest (COI), a type of worrisome event that warrants immediate notification. The information network is tasked to monitor these COIs and to alert the operator immediately when one is detected.
To implement VIRT, we need a vocabulary of terms, such as "location of target," "accuracy of location estimate," "weapons status," "communications capability," and "troop health status." These variables are associated with specific operations and units, and they may be indexed by space and time, because many of them are dynamic. A COI is then written as a kind of expression or "continuous query" that probes current information sources for a change from "non-event" to "event. by drastically reducing manning on their bridges. The next section explains why VIRT improvements are much more than just incremental. In fact, they are extraordinary.
ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE ADVANTAGE
Over the last two decades, huge improvements in manufacturing effectiveness were achieved through a combination of 'just-in-time" deliveries and other "supply chain integration" techniques. The key behind these improvements was to make each process step as efficient as possible and to minimize idle resources. Optimal results could be achieved if expensive processors and people were always busy on high-value products and unfinished products moved smartly from processor to processor, eliminating idle time and inventory.
It's helpful to look at business and military decisionmaking systems as "information chain" integration tasks, analogous to supply chain integration. In information chains, we are moving bits rather than molecules, but we still have scarce and expensive resources that shouldn't be wasted. In most military operations, our scarcest resources are time for decision making and communications bandwidth among mobile entities. We don't want to waste these resources by moving low-value bits or by creating backlogs of unprocessed bits awaiting analysis. In military contexts the penalties for delay are worse, because the bits are "perishable." Like fresh fruit, information is best consumed when ripe, before becoming stale. Furthermore, in military contexts poorly informed decisions can cost lives. Thus, the rewards for efficient information chains will be even greater than for efficient supply chains.
In a recent paper [8] , I evaluated the quantitative advantage of a VIRT approach ("smart push") for information dissemination and compared it to the best possible version of "smart pull," where operators retrieve information from the GIG relevant to their missions. The scenario involved a helicopter pilot flying a mission in hostile territory (akin to that in [7] ). Denning [4] paraphrased my analysis, and I reuse some of his pithy version in the paragraphs below.
Before starting, the pilot creates a flight plan that avoids storm cells and air defense positions. The pilot will deviate only on learning of changes in storm and defense positions, as well as movements of other aircraft, that intersect the flight path. Various other technologies (weather observation, radar) track storm movements, antiaircraft positions, and other aircraft through the entire region. Of all these data, however, the pilot will only value those that stimulate the pilot to consider promptly a deviation from the current route.
Consider a flight path through a region 200km on a side. Sensor resolution in the region is 1 km, giving 40,000 grid points. Vertically, data are available at 500m intervals from altitude 0 to 6 km, a total of 13 altitude coordinates. That gives 520K grid points in the 3-D volume. Forecasts of ten variables are tracked at each grid point, giving 5.2M data values in the volume. Weather forecasts are updated every 30 min., and the flight is scheduled for 4.5 hours, giving 10 update times. Thus the total size of the data space is approximately 52M values.
In a "dumb" push environment, the sensors and updaters send new information to the pilot whenever they get it, so during the 4.5 hr flight, the pilot receives all 52M values. If we instantiate a "smart pull" as described for example by Mr Krieger on behalf of ASD NII [9] , the pilot uses tools to search the data for items more obviously relevant to his interests. For example, he might discard data more than 5 km away from the flight path or set local filters to hide data that have changed less than 5% since their previous reading. Even if such filters remove 99% of the received values, the remaining 1% (520K potentially relevant values) will exceed the pilot's capacity to make sense of them and constitute a likely distraction. Worse, the 99% of values discarded wasted scarce bandwidth and probably slowed deliveries to other warfighters.
In a smart push environment, the pilot describes COIs so that data outside some radius of the planned flight path are irrelevant and alerts are received only when variables deviate enough from prior values to warrant considering a change in route. A VIRT data server receives these COIs and begins to monitor for COI events. The pilot is not likely to see more than 5 alerts on the whole flight, well within his processing capacity. If each alert is accompanied by 100 data values (to update the display), the 5 expected alerts present about 100,000 times less data than in the pull or simple push environment. These differences are significant and are very attractive to the pilot. While we don't know exactly how this reduction in workload translates into mission outcomes, we can be sure that the pilot won't be glutted, will notice the events, and will have sufficient attention resources to deal with them. Further, we have reduced bit flows by 99.999%, freeing up critical communication resources for other purposes.
When you improve bit flows by five orders of magnitude, you will change the organization in qualitative ways that will need to be supported by an appropriate system architecture. Throughout biological and man-made systems, each order of magnitude (10 X) change tends to induce both structural and qualitative changes. The benefits of VIRT may not always be as great as five orders of magnitude, but they will be huge. In a recent thesis, using a discrete event simulation, my student LCDR Ray Acevedo [10] [9] .
In a VIRT system, users define and refine expected conditions of interest (COI), while providers search for critical deltas and serve the users high value per bit.
These advantages are too big to ignore, yet there are many reasons to believe current DoD approaches won't attain them without some change in direction. In the next section, we consider the implicit approach being taken in GIG/NCES development and the risks entailed. That will lead ultimately to suggestions about how we can attain far greater results with lower risk.
MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR CHALLENGE
The US DoD is implementing the Global Information Grid as a way of providing integrated information and information processing services throughout the military. The architectural approach aims to leverage Internet and web service technology, using a Services Oriented Architecture (SOA). The foundation services are called Net-Centric Enterprise Services, or NCES (see www.disa.il/main/rodsolc nceshtml). The basic objective is to provide the infrastructure and tools for information superiority, where each operator can find and access all relevant information.
Beyond SOA, this goal of finding and accessing all relevant information requires that suppliers and consumers of information share some vocabulary and semantics. In the semantic web community, the term used to describe the concept of clearly specified semantics is ontology (see htt There are several reasons why supplier-oriented communities of interest won't likely give us the semantics and ontologies operators need. > Suppliers don't know what problems their users are trying to solve or how they solve them. > Suppliers don't use the same vocabulary or actual concepts as operators do. > Operators' objectives, missions, and processes are evolving faster than supplier community efforts to standardize ontologies. So, being brutally frank, we could easily spend a decade or more on efforts to standardize information ontologies before even beginning to evaluate the putative benefits of modern GIG/NCES capabilities to deliver VIRT. At that time, we'd discover that operator COIs are the foundation for specifying value and that COIs and vocabularies vary among different missions, echelons, and roles. So we'd find that we didn't have the required ontologies, couldn't specify operator COIs, and couldn't implement VIRT. In short, after a long infrastructure development, we'd realize we hadn't even started to deliver valued information.
I expect we could spend billions of dollars and a decade or more, before we confronted the fundamental question:
What information needs to be delivered to each operator, in a specific context, to improve the operator's outcome?" Rather than predictably proceeding into such a failure, we ought to consider if there's a better, lower-risk approach. That's the subject of the next and final section.
CONCLUSION: A CHANGE OF DIRECTION
We can probably all agree on a few important points. Timely valuable information can improve decisions and outcomes. Information is potentially valuable if it could improve outcomes, but to realize that potential the intended beneficiary has to receive it, attend to it, consider it and act upon it in time. In situations where human processing capacity is limited, where data glut is possible, and where communication bandwidth is limited, we must give priority to high-value bits. The only way to do this is to know which bits would materially affect the receiver. This requires understanding the operator's current state the goals, the assumptions, the beliefs so that contradictory events can be detected and quickly conveyed. In short, VIRT VIRT suggests and makes possible an incremental and evolutionary approach to information superiority. We can implement VIRT for a small number of operations at a time, covering the most important COIs first. This leads us to develop the vocabularies and ontologies incrementally. In each mission, we can deliver increasing value in proportion to the number of COIs monitored. Over time, we can extend the ontologies, COIs and missions. In short, we can implement incrementally and reap benefits incrementally. Moreover, we can recognize and address the essential evolutionary requirements from the outset, creating a process and technology base that can continually improve its coverage of missions, ontologies and COIs. In that way, we will achieve orders of magnitude better results with substantially lower costs, while realizing the goals of information superiority a whole lot faster.
